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Abstract: We report an experiment on payoff-equivalent provision and appropriation 
games with high-caste and low-caste Indian villagers. A central question is whether caste 
identities affect resolution of social dilemmas. Making caste salient in the 
experiment elicits striking changes in behavior compared to the baseline treatment with no 
information about others’ castes. Homogenous groups with high caste subjects are more 
successful in resolving social dilemmas than homogenous groups with low caste subjects. 
The success of mixed groups in resolving such dilemmas is somewhere between, which is 
inconsistent with in-group vs. out-group identity models. Absent salient information on 
caste, behavior is inconsistent with unconditional social preferences but as predicted by 
reciprocity. 
JEL Classification codes: C93, C70, H41, Z10  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Our central question is whether information on cultural identities affects resolution of 
social dilemmas. The identity distinctions we include in our research are among the world’s 
most profound: two thousand year old caste differences that are endemic in rural villages 
in India. The classic social dilemmas we study are central to research and policy: positive 
externalities from contributions to public goods and negative externalities from extractions 
from common pools.  
 The socio-economic hierarchy of the caste system remains a prominent feature of 
Indian society, especially in rural India. For a natural study of the caste system in our 
experiment we chose the environment of rural Indian villages.1 To maintain control over 
integrity of the experimental protocol, we chose villages in West Bengal so that one of the 
coauthors who speaks Bengali could personally conduct the experiment.2 Previous studies 
have reported caste identity effects on behavior when information on caste is salient (Hoff 
and Pandey 2006, Fehr et al. 2008).3 Even in Kerala, a reportedly progressive Indian state, 
                                                 
1 The strength of the Indian caste system can be witnessed even in urban environments in areas 
such as marital matching (Dugar, Bhattacharya and Reiley, 2012).  
2 Most villagers did not speak English and some (52 out of 808) were illiterate in Bengali. The 
experiment was conducted verbally in Bengali.  
3 In an experiment in rural Uttar Pradesh, Hoff and Pandey (2006) find no inter-caste performance 
difference while solving puzzles in a no-caste information case yet public revelation of caste led to 
a 20 percent drop in performance among lower caste subjects. Fehr et al. (2008) find that high caste 
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prominent disparity is found among some low caste groups (Deshpande, 2000). In this 
paper we focus on caste effects on behavior in economic interactions characterized by 
social dilemmas. 
 A social dilemma exists when actions motivated by individual incentives produce 
sufficiently strong externalities on others to render such actions inefficient. Social 
dilemmas arise with positive externalities from contributions in a provision game and 
negative externalities from extractions in an appropriation game. One important question 
is whether under-provision in a provision game is a more or less serious problem than over-
appropriation in an appropriation game. Phrased in this way, the question has no general 
answer because the feasible actions and payoffs in the provision and appropriation games 
may not be the same. We ask more specific questions that do have answers. In payoff-
equivalent provision and appropriation games: (1) is under-provision a more or less serious 
problem than over-appropriation and (2) is resolution of social dilemmas affected by salient 
information about caste identities. 
 Cox, Ostrom, Sadiraj, and Walker (2013) addressed the first question using two types 
of payoff-equivalent provision and appropriation games.4 They conducted their experiment 
with a convenience sample of undergraduate subjects at American universities. We here 
use the same types of social dilemma games to research how Indian caste identities affect 
efficiency of play in provision and appropriation games with asymmetric power.  
 We report results from asymmetric-power, sequential provision and appropriation 
experiments that directly reveal economic surplus foregone or destroyed by failure of 
cooperation. We compare the behavior of West Bengali villagers in a baseline treatment 
with no information provided about others’ castes to behavior in several treatments in 
which caste configurations of groups are made salient.  
                                                 
subjects in rural Uttar Pradesh are more likely to inflict punishment when the norm violator belongs 
to a low caste. 
4 In Cox et al. 2013 two types of payoff-equivalent provision and appropriation games are 
implemented as: (a) simultaneous-move, symmetric-power games; and (b) sequential-move, 
asymmetric-power games. Their sequential-move games include treatments in which the second 
mover observes the first movers’ contributions in the provision game or extractions in the 
appropriation game and, subsequently, may choose to increase efficiency of the final allocation or 
reduce it, possibly to zero. 
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 By design, the provision game and the appropriation game in our study are payoff 
equivalent, therefore behavior is predicted to be the same across the two games by 
conventional models of social preferences regardless of whether they are spiteful (Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) or altruistic (Andreoni and Miller 2002; Cox 
and Sadiraj 2007). In contrast, reciprocal preferences theory (Cox, Friedman, 
and Sadiraj 2008) predicts more altruistic (or less spiteful) behavior by second movers in 
a provision game than in a payoff-equivalent appropriation game at any information set. 
Furthermore, in-group vs out-group theory predicts second mover’s allocation to the group 
fund (in either a provision or appropriation game) is: (a) always at the minimum feasible 
when low and high castes interact, and (b) game invariant in the two payoff-equivalent 
games. We test hypotheses derived from the alternative models.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an exposition of 
payoff equivalence between the provision and appropriation games. Section III reports 
implications of alternative theoretical models for these games. Section IV explains the 
experimental design and protocol. Section V compares and contrasts behavior of villagers 
who are not informed about other participants’ castes or are informed of alternative 
homogeneous or heterogeneous caste compositions of subjects. Section VI concludes. 
II. PAYOFF-EQUIVALENT PROVISION AND APPROPRIATION GAMES 
We report experiments with the “king” versions of the provision game and appropriation 
game included in Cox, et al. (2013). 
A. Provision game 
This game has n players consisting of n-1 first movers and one second mover. The first 
movers simultaneously choose how much to provide, jp  to a Group Fund from their 
endowments in their Individual Funds. Each individual is endowed with e  “tokens” in her 
Individual Fund and can allocate any portion of it (in integers) to the Group Fund. 
Contributions to the Group Fund create surplus; each token added to the Group Fund 
decreases the value of the Individual Fund of the contributor by 1 rupee and Increases the 
value of the Group Fund by m rupees, n > m > 1.  
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 After observing the first movers’ choices, the second mover (player s) can choose to 
contribute any non-negative number of tokens up to his endowment, e  to the Group Fund. 
Alternatively, the second mover can choose to take (in integer amounts) any part of the 
tokens previously contributed by the n-1 first movers. Thus, the second mover’s feasible 
set is . 
 Let  denote the vector of numbers of tokens contributed to the Group 
Fund good by the n players.5 The payoff to player i in the provision game equals the amount 
of her endowment, e  less the amount contributed to the Group Fund, ip  plus an equal (1/n) 
share of m times the amounts contributed to the Group Fund by all players:6 
(1)  
B. Appropriation game 
The game has n players consisting of n-1 first movers and one second mover. The Group 
Fund is endowed with ne tokens worth m rupees each, for a starting total value of mne 
rupees. The first movers simultaneously choose how much to appropriate from the Group 
Fund. Each first mover can choose an amount,  from the feasible set {0,1, , }e⋅ ⋅ ⋅  to 
appropriate from the Group Fund. Extractions from the Group Fund destroy surplus; each 
token removed from the Group Fund increases the value of the Individual Fund of the 
appropriator by 1 rupee but reduces the value of the Group Fund by m rupees where, as 
above, n > m > 1.  
 After observing the first mover choices, the second mover decides how many of the 
remaining  tokens to appropriate. The second mover (player s) chooses an 
amount  to extract from the feasible set . 
                                                 
5 We use bold letters for vectors. 
6 Note the asymmetry between the most selfish choices for the first and second movers. The most 
selfish choice for a first mover is 0 whereas it is  for the second mover. 
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 Let z denote the vector of numbers of tokens appropriated from the Group Fund by 
the n players. The payoff to player i equals the number of tokens he appropriates from the 
Group Fund plus an equal (1/n) share of the remaining value of the Group Fund after the 
appropriations by all players (which is m times the total number of tokens left in the Group 
Fund by all players):7  
(2)   
C. Payoff Equivalence 
The provision and appropriation games are constructed to be payoff equivalent. Indeed, for 
each vector of appropriations, z transferred to Individual Funds in the appropriation game 
there exists a vector of provisions,  transferred to the Group Fund in the 
provision game such that the payoff to any player is the same in both games.8  
 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES FOR PROVISION AND 
APPROPRIATION GAMES 
Several testable hypotheses, for social preferences as well as in-group vs. out-group 
preferences, will be derived in this section. For unconditional (social or homo economicus) 
preferences, the payoff equivalent provision and appropriation games are also strategically 
equivalent and therefore efficiency is the same in the two game forms. Because the first 
movers’ choices are known to the second mover, the latter’s choice can be modeled as 
determining the final amount of a public good (Varian 1994). First movers’ amounts put in 
(provision game) or left in (appropriation game) the Group Fund serve as “income” (in the 
budget constraint) for the second mover. The second mover’s final choice of allocation to 
the Group Fund (as a normal good) then increases in income, i.e., in first movers’ total 
Group Fund allocation. 
                                                 
7 The maximum extraction for a first mover is e whereas for the second mover is . 
8 Use statements (1) and (2) to verify that  for all .  
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     Group Composition and Altruism. Consider two groups of individuals, say, group 1 
and group 2. Suppose that individuals in group 2 are sufficiently more altruistic than 
individuals in in group 1.9 The question we ask is: How does efficiency of play vary when 
first and second movers come from the same group or from different groups?  
 Revealed Altruism. Next, suppose that an individual’s preferences are affected by 
others’ actions. What are implications of reciprocal preferences (Cox, Friedman, and 
Sadiraj 2008) for play across games?  Proposition 1 provides theoretical statements that 
are informative for these questions and are empirically testable; proofs are relegated to 
Appendix I. 
Proposition 1. Let group 2 be sufficiently more altruistic than group 1. In payoff-
equivalent, sequential provision and appropriation games, efficiency of play: 
1. Between games is: 
a.  game invariant for unconditional preferences 
b.  higher in the provision game for reciprocal preferences 
2. Within a game is:   
a. largest when all first and second movers are from group 2 
b. smallest when all first and second movers are from group 1 
c. somewhere between when first and second movers are from different groups. 
Proof: See Appendix I.  
  
 Our first testable hypotheses for play efficiency across games come from Proposition 
1.1. Part 1.1a provides the null hypothesis for efficiencies across games whereas revealed 
altruism theory (part 1.1b) provides an alternative hypothesis. That is: 
 
Hypothesis 1.N: Efficiency of play is the same in payoff-equivalent, sequential 
provision and appropriation games.  
                                                 
9 We say that a type 2 player (from Group 2) is sufficiently more altruistic than a type 1 player (from Group 
1) if the positive (type 2 – type 1) difference between the demands for the public good of the two types 
increases with income. 
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Hypothesis 1.A: Efficiency of play is higher in the sequential provision game than in 
the payoff-equivalent sequential appropriation game.  
 
 In our second hypothesis we keep the game fixed and look at effects of group 
composition on efficiency of play for groups with different levels of altruism. It follows 
from parts a-c of Proposition 1.2 that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: In either game, efficiency is:  
a. Highest (lowest) in the more (least) altruistic homogenous group; 
b. Somewhere between in a mixed-caste group. 
 Next, we look at implications of a group identity model developed in Appendix I. 
Let the population be composed of two distinct groups of individuals. We assume that 
people care not only about their own Individual Fund but also about externalities: positive 
when providing to the Group Fund or negative when appropriating from it. Following 
literature on modeling in-group vs out-group attitudes10 we assume that individual 
preferences over externalities are characterized by goodwill towards insiders (one’s own 
caste) but by animosity towards outsiders (another caste). We call such preferences 
“identity-contingent” and model them with individuals’ utilities increasing in insiders’ 
payoffs but deceasing in outsiders’ payoffs. These identity-contingent preferences are 
game-invariant, and therefore the first implication is that play be the same in the payoff-
equivalent provision and appropriation games. In the case of cross-caste play by mixed 
groups in our experiment, all first movers are from the same cast whereas the second mover 
is from a different cast. It follows from animosity towards outsiders in mixed groups, and 
m/n < 1, that the second mover’s optimal decision is to take all tokens in the Group Fund. 
Hence in subgame perfect equilibrium it is optimal for the first movers to provide nothing 
or appropriate everything in cross-caste play with mixed groups.  
 
 
                                                 
10 Seminal papers on social identity include Tajfel and Turner (1979), Akerlof and Kranton (2000), 
and Benabou and Tirole (2006). Experiments on social identity include Eckel and Grossman 
(2004), Hoff and Pandey (2006), Chen and Li (2009), and Eaton, Eswaran, and Oxoby (2011). 
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Proposition 2: Identity-contingent preferences imply: 
1. Efficiency of play is game invariant for any given group composition of first 
movers and second mover; 
2. Null final allocation to the Group Fund when second mover is from different group 
than first movers.  
 
Proof: See Appendix I.  
 
An implication of Proposition 2.1 is the same as the one stated in Hypothesis 1.a above. 
An implication of Proposition 2.2 (within-caste favoritism) offers an alternative to 
Hypothesis 2.b, which is our last hypothesis. 
 
 Hypothesis 3: Efficiency is lower in mixed-caste play than in homogeneous-caste 
play.   
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
A. Experimental Treatments  
The treatments in this experiment cross the provision or appropriation game form with 
caste configurations in a 2 X 5 design. The caste configurations are as follows: 
1. No caste information (“No-Info”) 
2. Three high caste first movers and one high caste second mover (“High-High”) 
3. Three high caste first movers and one low caste second mover (“High-Low) 
4. Three low caste first movers and one high caste second mover (“Low-High”) 
5. Three low caste first movers and one low caste second mover (“Low-Low”) 
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B. Procedures            
We have a total of 808 subjects: 788 of them are Hindu (434 low-caste and 354 high-caste)  
and 20 are Muslim.11 Each subject participated in only one treatment. Twenty-one 
experimental sessions were conducted with each session lasting 3-4 hours. Each 
experimental session was planned for approximately 40 subjects; however some sessions 
had 44-48 subjects and one session had 32 subjects. The sessions were conducted in West 
Bengal, India with assistance from three Non-Government Organizations (NGOs).12 At 
each village, volunteers from the NGO visited people’s homes a few days before the 
experiment and read aloud the invitation script written by us (in Bengali). The volunteers 
invited only one individual from each family.  
 At the beginning of each session, the experimenter (U. Sen) was introduced to the 
assembled participants by the Secretary of the NGO and thereafter she read aloud (in 
Bengali) the consent form for the subjects. Subjects indicated their willingness to 
participate by either signing the form or putting in a thumb print (for subjects unable to 
read or write). Information on caste was collected and used in treatment group assignments. 
Other demographics (such as years of education, gender, marital status) were also 
collected. Every subject was a member of a four-person group and made only one decision. 
 After the experiment began, the experimenter read the instructions in Bengali and 
answered questions. An individual subject’s decision was recorded privately in a separate 
room by the experimenter. The final payment at the end of the experiment was handed out 
to each subject privately and separately. Each subject was paid according to what decision 
he or she had made in the experiment as well as the decisions made by the other group 
members in addition to the Rs 50 show-up fee.  
 In each of the five provision game treatments, each individual was endowed with 
Rs150 in an Individual Fund. The first movers’ decision task was whether to move money 
from their Individual Funds to the Group Fund. Each of the three first movers could 
                                                 
11 Our “High Caste” grouping includes Brahmins, Kshatryias, and Vaishyas while our “Low Caste” 
grouping includes Sudras and Untouchables. All 20 Muslim subjects participated in the No 
Information treatment. 
12 Locations for the West Bengal experiments were: (1) Sagar Island, South 24 Parganas, West 
Bengal, (2) Panarhat, Falta area, South 24 Parganas, West Bengal, and (3) Jharkhali, Canning & 
Basanti block, South 24 Parganas, West Bengal.  
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contribute anything from zero to Rs150 (their entire endowment) to the Group Fund in 
increments of Rs15.13 Any amount of money moved to the Group Fund reduced the value 
of the decision maker’s Individual Fund by that amount and increased the value of the 
Group Fund by three-times that amount. The second mover could contribute some or all of 
her own Rs150 Individual Fund endowment to the Group Fund or she could withdraw some 
or all of the contributions of the three first movers.  
 In each of the five appropriation game treatments, a group was endowed with 
Rs1,800 in their Group Fund. The choice of each individual was whether to move money 
from the Group Fund to his or her Individual Fund. A first mover could move any amount 
from 0 to Rs150 into her Individual Fund in increments of Rs15. Any amount of money 
appropriated from the Group Fund increased the value of the Individual Fund by that 
amount and reduced the value of the Group Fund by three-times that amount. The second 
mover could withdraw none, some, or the entire amount left in the Group Fund by the first 
movers.  
 In both provision and appropriation treatments, an individual’s earnings equal the 
end value of his Individual Fund plus one-fourth of the end value of the Group Fund. Note 
that the above amounts of money are economically significant: the minimum wage for 
unskilled workers in West Bengal at the time of this study was Rs110-130 per day.14 
Subjects were informed about the (single blind) payoff procedures. Further details on the 
procedures used in conducting the experiment are reported in Appendix II. 
 
V. HOW SALIENT CASTE INFORMATION AFFECTS BEHAVIOR 
 
A central question is the effect of salient information about caste identity on cooperation 
in the presence of positive or negative externalities. What effect does knowledge of other 
players’ castes have on the ability of group members to generate surplus in a provision 
game or not destroy latent surplus in an appropriation game?  
                                                 
13 The Rs15 unit of divisibility was chosen in order to make the feasible set of choices in India the 
same as in an earlier experiment in the U.S. (Cox, et al., 2013) in which a subject could choose an 
integer from {0,1, …,10} when deciding on the number of dollars to transfer between accounts. 
14 Source: http://labour.nic.in/wagecell/Wages/WestBengalWages.pdf  
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 We will report outcomes from experimental treatments with a measure of efficiency 
of play. The minimum possible payoff to a group of subjects in a provision or appropriation 
game is ne, where n is the number of subjects and e is the Private Fund endowment of each 
subject in the provision game. The actual payoff to subject i is .iπ  Hence the actual surplus 
to a group generated by playing a provision or appropriation game is 
1
n
i
i
neπ
=
−∑ . The 
maximum possible group payoff in either type of game is mne, where m is the multiplier 
on Group Fund contributions in the provision game and mne is the value of the Group Fund 
endowment in the appropriation game. The maximum possible surplus that can be 
generated by playing a game is mne ne− . Hence, the observed efficiency of play is:  
 (3) 1100
n
i
i
ne
mne ne
π
α =
−
= ×
−
∑
  
A. Caste-Uninformed Play 
We first compare behavior in the two payoff-equivalent games by subjects who are not 
informed about caste(s) of others in their game. Data suggest strong game form effects on 
efficiencies, with provision games eliciting more cooperative behavior than appropriation 
games. As shown in the first row of Table 1, the (mean) efficiency in the provision game 
is 44.9% (21 groups) for the No Caste Information provision game treatment. In contrast, 
<Table 1 about here> 
in the No Caste Information appropriation treatment the (mean) efficiency is about half as 
much, 20.7% (18 groups). Our data reject game invariance efficiency (Hypothesis 1N) in 
favor of provision game eliciting more cooperation than the appropriation game 
(Hypothesis 1A).15 Our first finding is:  
                                                 
15 The null hypothesis of observed efficiencies in the two games being drawn from the same 
distribution is rejected at 1% level of significance; p-values are 0.002 for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test and 0.006 for the Mann-Whitney test. 
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 Result 1: Inefficiencies from social dilemmas are more severe in the appropriation 
 game than in the payoff-equivalent provision game for caste-uninformed 
 villagers.  
Interestingly, this appropriation vs. provision game effect for caste-uniformed villagers is 
similar to the finding for student subjects at American universities reported by Cox, 
Ostrom, Sadiraj, and Walker (2013).  
 Before we examine behavioral effects of making information on caste identity 
salient, we inquire on levels of generosity across high and low caste villagers in the No-
caste Information treatments using the tobit estimator. 16 The list of explanatory variables 
includes decision maker’s caste (High caste dummy), game form (Appropriation dummy), 
interaction of the two (Appropriation x High), gender (Male), marital status (Married 
dummy) and two education levels: Lower education (less than 7 years of study) and Higher 
education (more than 10 years of study).  
 Using first mover data,17 the tobit estimated coefficient for High caste rejects the null 
hypothesis of similar generosity (trust and/or altruism) in favor of higher generosity for 
high caste villagers: 64.89 (one-side p-value=0.054). Another significant variable is marital 
status (68, p-value=0.048 for Married). The tobit regression for second mover choices18 
(nobs. = 33, 9 left-censored, 13 right-censored) adds the sum of first movers’ choices to 
the list of explanatory variables used in the FM tobit. Tobit estimate of High (caste second 
mover) coefficient is not significantly different from 0 (-107, p-value=0.603). Significant 
variables for second movers’ decisions are game form (-368, p-value=0.077 for 
Appropriation dummy) and education (-413, p-value=0.037 for Lower education dummy). 
It should also be noted that the null hypothesis of no effect of sum of first movers’ choices 
is rejected in favor of a positive effect as the tobit estimated coefficient for it is 1.11 (one 
sided p-value=0.059). 
                                                 
16 Data from Muslim villagers (14 first movers and 6 second movers) are not included. 
17 Total number of observations is 103; 32 left-censored (at 0) and 26 right-censored (at 150). Data 
from 14 (Muslim) first movers who were not Hindu are not included for better comparability across 
treatments. 
18 Dependent variable is the final amount left in the Group Fund. Total number of observations is 
33; 9 left-censored (at 0) and 13 right-censored (at 150 plus sum of first movers’ choices). Data 
from 6 (Muslim) second movers who were not Hindu are not included. 
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B. Within-Caste and Between-Caste Play 
Behavioral responses to making information on caste salient is provided in Table 1. The 
Efficiency columns show how the efficiency of play between games, given by equation 
(3), varies with subject caste configurations. The First Mover Total columns report the total 
number of tokens allocated to the Group Fund by (the three) first movers whereas the 
Second Mover Final columns show the number of tokens in the Group Fund after the 
second movers make their choices.19 Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. Entries 
in each column correspond to play across different caste compositions within the same 
game. The largest and the smallest values in each column are in bold. To help visual 
detection of any patterns on realized efficiency, Figure 1 displays efficiency distributions 
for each of the five caste-composition treatment and the two games. 
 Caste Effect. Visual inspection of the left panel (provision game) in Figure 1 reveals 
that compared to the no-caste information (solid line) efficiency distribution in the 
homogenous low-caste treatment (short-dashed line) is a shift-left but in the homogenous 
high-caste treatment (long-dashed line) is a right-shift. Similar patterns appear in the right 
panel (appropriation game) but performance in the baseline appears to be closer to the play 
of homogenous low caste groups. Average efficiencies are above 55 percent in the 
homogenous high caste groups (High-High row in Table 1), but below 17 percent in 
homogenous low caste groups (Low-Low row in Table 1); efficiencies in the mixed-caste 
groups are somewhere between. Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis of equal 
efficiency between homogenous and mixed groups in favor of: (1) higher efficiency in the 
homogenous high-caste groups (p-value is 0.018), and (2) lower efficiency in the 
homogeneous low-caste groups (p-value is 0.002).20 Note that efficiency in mixed-caste 
groups being larger than in homogeneous low-caste is inconsistent with the group-
contingent preferences (Hypothesis 3); the pattern is consistent with Hypothesis 2 if high-
                                                 
19 Recall that the value of the Group Fund in rupees is three times the total number of tokens in the 
Group Fund. 
20 When conducting this test we pool data from both games. The mean efficiencies are 0.57 (33 
observations, High-High), 0.17 (46 observations, Low-Low) and 0.39 (84 observations, mixed 
groups).  
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caste villagers are more altruistic than low-caste villagers, a supposition that seems to be 
supported by our data.21 We conclude that: 
 Result 2a. Homogenous groups with high caste subjects are more successful in 
 resolving social dilemmas than homogenous groups with low caste subjects. The 
 success of mixed groups in resolving such dilemmas is somewhere between.  
<Figure 1 about here> 
 Game effect. Absent information on caste the provision game elicits more 
cooperation than the appropriation game, as summarized in Result 1. But providing 
information on caste identity seems to mute any game effects; for all homogeneous and 
mixed caste compositions, play efficiencies across provision and appropriation games in 
our experiment are similar.  
 Result 2b. Resolutions of social dilemmas by caste-informed villagers are similar 
 across provision and appropriation games. 
There is some evidence, however, for a game effect. Mixed groups have higher efficiency 
than No-caste Information groups in the appropriation game but not in the provision 
game.22  
 These findings on play efficiencies raise some additional questions. Are high caste 
subjects better at resolving social dilemmas because of a higher level of trust? Or is it due 
to different social norms (reciprocity, altruism) among villagers from different castes? We 
next turn our attention to the effect of information about caste on first mover and second 
mover actions.  
C. Effects of Caste Information on First Mover Behavior Across Games 
                                                 
21 See Table 2 (first row) and Table 4 (second row), model specification (3).  
22 Compare the low of 20.7 percent, absent caste information, to 38.7 percent for the pooled (High-
Low and Low-High) mixed caste groups; these differences are significant according to Mann-
Whitney test (p-value= 0.061).  
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Final Group Fund allocation increases in total contributions of first movers when the Group 
Fund is a normal good23 making trusting or altruistic behavior of first movers vital for 
resolution of social dilemmas. For game comparison purposes we consider the decisions 
of FMs as the token amounts allocated to the Group Fund in the provision game or token 
amounts left in (not extracted from) the Group Fund in the appropriation game. Aggregated 
figures (means and standard deviations) of the first movers are reported in the middle two 
columns of Table 1. In provision games, average total amounts contributed by FMs vary 
from a low of 192 (out of 450, or 43%) in the Low-High treatment to a high of 284 (63%) 
in the High-Low treatment. In the appropriation game, average total amounts not extracted 
vary from a low of 115 (26%) in the Low-Low treatment to a high of 280 (62%) in the 
High-High treatment. Kruskal-Wallis rank test rejects the null hypothesis of similar first 
mover behavior across treatments: p-values are 0.016 (provision) and 0.001 
(appropriation). 24 
 To control for individual characteristics and get a better understanding of first 
movers’ behavior we look closely at individual level data. Overall, twenty-eight percent25 
(169 out of 606) of first movers allocated 0 to the Group Fund but we also see a comparable 
figure for high contributions with twenty-seven percent26 (165 out of 606) of first movers 
allocating all 150 to the Group Fund. Figure 2 shows distributions of first movers’ 
allocations to the Group Fund across the ten treatments; the top and bottom panels show 
data for provision and appropriation games, respectively.  
<Figure 2 about here> 
 For any given caste composition (including the No-caste Information control 
treatment), the number of FMs choosing 0 is larger in the appropriation game than in the 
provision game, indicating presence of extensive margin effects of game form. Table 2 
shows detailed percentage figures on left-censoring (at 0) and right-censoring (at 150) of 
allocations to the Group Fund across our ten treatments. Tobit estimated coefficients are 
                                                 
23 See Appendix I for a theoretical discussion, Table 4 and Appendix III (Figure A.2) for empirical 
evidence. 
24 Significance increases (p-values are 0.008 (provision) and 0.0002 (appropriation)) if data from 
caste-uninformed groups are excluded. 
25 18.27% (provision) and 38.10% (appropriation). 
26 27.88% (provision) and 26.53% (appropriation). 
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reported in Table 2. The control treatment is the No-caste Information treatment. The 
dependent variable is amount put in (provision game) or left in (appropriation game) the 
Group Fund. The left-censoring and right-censoring are at 0 and 150. 
<Table 2 about here> 
Caste identity effects in treatments with Information. Caste identity effects on generosity 
(trust and/or altruism) levels when caste information is made salient are of particular 
interest. Tobit estimated coefficients reported in Table 2 indicate treatment effects 
compared to the baseline (No-caste Information); we will discuss implications of these 
estimates in the following paragraph. First consider the bottom three rows of the table 
where we report tests on equality of the estimated coefficients across caste information 
treatments. Entries in these rows are differences between estimated coefficients for model 
(2) with demographics; for example 48.78 in the High-Low row and left-side Low-High 
column for the provision game is the difference between 32.524 and -16.256. P-values are 
reported in parentheses; Holm-Bonferroni adjusted significance levels are marked with 
asterisks (Holm, 1979). In the appropriation game, Low-Low elicits less generosity than 
any other treatment.27  We conclude that: 
  Result 3. First mover generosity is lowest in the Low-Low appropriation game 
 treatment.  
Comparison to No-Information treatment. Table 3 reports average marginal effects for 
tobit specification (2) in Table 2. The MinChoice column of Table 3 reports average 
marginal effects of caste identities on probability of positive allocations. The MaxChoice 
column reports average marginal effects of caste identities on probability of allocations 
being smaller than 150. Entries in Table 3 are interpreted as follows, using figures reported 
for the Low-Low treatment for the appropriation game (fourth row, right three columns) as 
examples. The -0.214 entry in the MinChoice column indicates that, on average, the 
likelihood of leaving a positive amount in the Group Fund is lower by 21.4 percent in the 
Low-Low treatment compared to the No-caste Information treatment. The 0.144 entry in 
the MaxChoice column says that, on average, the likelihood of leaving less than the 
                                                 
27 See also Figure A.1, top panel for predicted extensive margins with 95% C.I. across treatments. 
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maximum of 150 in Low-Low treatment is 14.4 percent higher than in the No-caste 
Information treatment. The -6.637 entry in the Linear column means that uncensored 
subjects, on average, are predicted to extract about 6.6 more from the Group Fund in the 
Low-Low treatment then in the No-caste Information treatment. Figures in these three 
columns show how FM behavior contributes to the low efficiency observed in the Low-
Low treatment. The FMs in this treatment are more likely to leave 0, less likely to leave 
the maximum of 150, and leave less in the Group Fund when their allocations are from the 
interior of the feasible choice set.  
<Table 3 about here> 
 For the provision game, the High-Low treatment (second row, left three columns of 
Table 3) shows an opposite pattern of comparison to the No Caste Information treatment. 
FMs in the High-Low treatment are 8.4 percent more likely to make a positive contribution 
to the Group Fund, 11.5 percent more likely to contribute the maximum amount, and 
contribute about 6.4 more, on average, when choosing on the interior of the feasible choice 
set. These results are summarized by: 
 Result 4. Making information on caste salient, induces:  
a. Lower generosity in the Low-Low appropriation game treatment 
b. Higher generosity in the High-Low provision game  treatment  
 
Some of the demographic characteristics of subjects have significant effects on FM 
behavior. In the provision game, compared to villagers with 7 to 10 years of study, subjects 
with Lower Education (less than 7 years) are less likely to make a positive contribution, 
less likely to contribute 150, and contribute less when in the interior of the feasible set. 
Thus, villagers with less than 7 years of study are less generous in the provision game. In 
the appropriation game, however, trust levels are not significantly different across 
education levels. The “Lower Education” demographic group is not confounded with low 
caste; perhaps surprisingly, there is no significant difference between the distributions of 
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educational attainment for the low caste and high caste subject samples in our experiment.28 
This effect of this subject characteristic may reflect low education, per se, or low income 
resulting from low education or some combined effect.29 Married subjects are more 
generous; they are more likely to make a positive contribution, more likely to contribute 
the maximum, and contribute more when in the interior of the feasible set in both games. 
Finally, when opportunities for surplus creation are available in provision games, 
contributions, reported in Table 1, are highest among groups with high caste FMs: 284 
(High-Low) and 265 (High-High). This pattern is also observed in the presence of surplus 
destruction prospects in appropriation games with the high caste FMs showing much 
greater restraint by leaving a larger quantity (280 to a high caste SM and 250 to a low caste 
SM) in the Group Fund. Pooling all first mover data from the caste information treatments, 
we find that high caste first movers contribute on average 53 percent more than low caste 
FMs, indicating higher generosity among high caste villagers. The pattern remains when 
controlling for demographics. Tobit estimated coefficient for High Caste FM (Table 2, first 
row, specification (3)) is significantly positive using all of the data.  
  
 Result 5. High caste first movers are more generous than low caste first movers. 
D. Effects of Caste Information on Second Mover Behavior Across Games 
The first movers’ total allocation to the Group Fund is known to the second mover when 
she makes her decision. Furthermore, the total amount put in or left in the Group Fund by 
the first movers is available to the second mover to allocate between the Group Fund and 
her Individual Fund; in that way first movers’ total allocation is added to the second 
mover’s endowment to determine the budget constraint on second mover’s choice. The 
second mover’s choice determines the final level of the Group Fund, which can be 
characterized as the second mover’s “demand” for the public good (Varian 1994). Thus, 
while generosity of first movers is a necessary condition for efficiency it is not sufficient 
                                                 
28 Distribution for the low caste first movers is: 26.23% (lower education), 49.07% (base) and 
24.69% (higher education). For the high caste first movers these figures are: 29.10% (lower 
education), 44.03% (base) and 26.87% (higher education). Differences are insignificant according 
to Pearson test (chi2(2)=1.51, p=0.471). 
29 See Appendix II for difficulties on collecting reliable information on income. 
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as the second mover can appropriate all there is in the Group Fund, driving efficiency to 0. 
This is clearly the optimal choice for a selfish individual, but it is also the prediction for 
socially-oriented individuals with in-group vs. out-group identity preferences in our mixed-
cast treatments (Proposition 2.2). 
 The total first movers’ allocation to the Group Fund and the second movers’ choices 
of final amounts of the Group Fund are shown on the horizontal and vertical axes of Figure 
3.30 The horizontal lines at 0 and the upward sloping lines show the lower and upper 
censoring limits on second movers’ choices of final amounts of the Group Fund, 
respectively, at 0 and 150 plus sum of first movers’ contributions. Allocations in the 
provision games are shown in the top panel and allocations in the appropriation games are 
shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3. We observe substantial variations in binding 
censoring limits across caste compositions and game forms, indicating treatment effects at 
extensive margins.  For example, in the provision game for the High-High treatment 
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
(top panel, second figure from left) only one observation is at the lower censoring limit of 
0 whereas seven observations are at the upward censoring limits (150 plus aggregate FMs 
allocations). Furthermore, all except two of the observations are at or close to the upward 
censoring limits. In contrast, consider the appropriation game for the Low-Low treatment 
in the bottom right figure. Here, there is only one observation at the upper censoring bound 
while there are seven observations at the lower bound (i.e., leaving nothing in the Group 
Fund).  
 The scatter diagrams illustrate why special care needs to be used in regression 
analysis of the data. Our approach is to use tobit estimator that can accommodate the fixed 
lower bound at 0 and the variable upper bound. Tobit estimated coefficients are reported 
in Table 4 whereas average marginal treatment effects are reported in Table 5. The control 
group is the No-caste Information treatment.  
 
                                                 
30 The second movers’ choices of final amounts of the Group Fund are also reported in Table 1, but 
because such choices depend on variable first movers’ total allocations it is hard to use these 
averages for inferences on second mover behavior. 
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<Table 4 about here> 
 
 Tobit estimated coefficients for FM total allocation to the Group Fund for both the 
provision and appropriation games are positive and highly significant for all models, both 
with and without treatment dummies and demographics, as shown in the top row of Table 
4.31 These positive estimates reveal that second movers’ choice of final amount in the 
Group Fund increases in “income” (i.e., first movers’ total allocation to the Group Fund 
plus 150).32 We conclude that: 
 Result 6. SM’s final choice for the Group Fund increases in total allocation of FMs 
 to the Group Fund. 
 
Caste identity effects in treatments with information. Next, we inquire about second mover 
behavior across treatments with salient information on caste. In the last three rows of Table 
4 we report tests for equality of tobit estimated coefficients across four caste composition 
treatments. P-values are reported in parentheses; Holm-Bonferroni adjusted significance 
levels are marked with asterisks (Holm, 1979). Data from our experiment indicate 
significantly higher SM generosity in the homogenous high caste provision game treatment 
than in the homogenous low caste provision game.  That is: 
 Result 7. Second movers are less cooperative in the Low-Low provision treatment 
than in the High-High provision treatment.  
 
Comparison to No-Caste Information treatment. Average treatment effects are reported in 
Table 5 using tobit specification (2) in Table 4. In comparison to the No-caste Information 
treatment, SMs in the Low-Low provision treatment are 34 percent more likely to 
appropriate all that is in the Group Fund, 40.5 percent less likely to choose the maximum 
                                                 
31 While significantly different from 0 neither estimate is statistically different from 1.  
32 For effects at the margins see Figure A.2 in Appendix III. Margins for positive provisions (left 
figures) and uncensored provision levels (right figures) increase with FM total allocations whereas 
margins for less than maximum provisions (middle column figures) decrease. These patterns are 
robust across all treatments but the magnitudes of response depend on caste-composition and game 
form. We see largest response for High-High (long dashed lines) groups and weakest response for 
the Low-Low (short dashed lines) provision treatment and No-caste information (solid lines) 
appropriation treatment. 
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feasible provision level, and for uncensored provisions, the expected level is 51 tokens less. 
Qualitatively similar patterns of second mover choices are observed in mixed caste (High-
Low and Low-High) treatments. Behavior of SMs in the High-High and No-caste 
information treatment is similar in the provision game.  In contrast, in the appropriation 
game SMs in High-High are 28.6 percent more likely to refrain from taking everything, 
34.3 percent more likely to take nothing, and uncensored takes are, on average, 30.6 tokens 
less than in the No Caste Information treatment. A qualitatively similar but less significant 
pattern of SM choices is observed in the Low-High appropriation treatment. We conclude 
that: 
 Result 8. Making information on caste salient induces second movers to:  
a. Reduce provision in mixed and homogenous low-caste provision game 
treatments; 
b. Appropriate less in homogenous high-caste appropriation game treatment. 
 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We experiment with provision and appropriation games that directly reveal economic 
surplus foregone or destroyed by failure of cooperation. In the provision game, each subject 
has an endowment in his or her Individual Fund. Amounts transferred to the Group Fund 
generate surplus. In the appropriation game, the group has an endowment in the Group 
Fund. Amounts transferred to Individual Funds destroy latent surplus. Our provision and 
appropriation games incorporate a type of power asymmetry that provides ample 
opportunity for failure of cooperation. Three first movers simultaneously decide how much 
to contribute to the Group Fund (provision game) or extract from it (appropriation game). 
One second mover makes the final allocation to the Group Fund after observing choices 
made by the first movers. In both games, the second mover can increase or decrease the 
allocation to the Group Fund by the first movers. 
 The provision and appropriation games in our experiment are payoff equivalent. 
They are strategically equivalent for all models of unconditional (selfish or social) 
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preferences as well as for caste-identity-contingent preferences for fixed group 
compositions (homogenous or mixed). Revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman and 
Sadiraj 2008) predicts specific differences in play between the games: that second movers 
will behave more altruistically in the provision game than in the appropriation game. Caste-
identity-contingent preferences predict null allocation to the Group Fund by mixed-caste 
groups in both provision and appropriation games. Tests of these predictions reveal the 
following. Observed play by villagers who are informed about the caste identities of others 
is inconsistent with in-group and out-group behavior based on caste identity. In the No-
Caste Information treatment, observed differences in play of second movers across 
provision and appropriation games are consistent with the predictions of revealed altruism 
theory but inconsistent with implications of unconditional (social or selfish) preferences as 
well as caste-identity-contingent preferences. 
Behavioral patterns are heterogeneous in treatments in which the Indian villagers are 
informed about the caste identities of other subjects. The highest efficiency is obtained in 
both provision and appropriation games when three high caste first movers are matched 
with a high caste second mover (High-High treatment). The lowest efficiency is observed 
in both games when three low caste first movers are matched with a low caste second 
mover (Low-Low treatment). Within-group behavior by low caste subjects failed to resolve 
social dilemmas: they forwent 83 percent of available surplus in the provision game and 
destroyed 84 percent of latent surplus in the appropriation game. In the provision game, 
low efficiency is implemented through absence of reciprocal altruism by low-caste second 
movers towards low-caste first movers (Table 5, fourth row). In the appropriation game, 
low efficiency is triggered by absence of trust and altruism by low-caste first movers 
towards low-caste second movers (Table 3, fourth row). Similar behavior of low-status 
groups has previously been observed in many other cultures. 
 Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) reports an experiment in which Israeli university 
subjects are identified to each other using names that distinguish Ashkenazic Jews (of 
European descent) from Eastern Jews (of Asian and African descent). Using the investment 
game (Berg, et al. 1995), they detected a systematic mistrust toward men of Eastern origin. 
The systematic mistrust of subjects of Eastern origin was common not only among 
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Ashkenazic players, but also among Eastern subjects who discriminate against others from 
their own group.  
 Hanna and Linden (2012) recruited Indian children to compete for a large financial 
prize (55.5 percent of the parents’ monthly income) by completing exams. Local teachers 
were recruited to grade the exams. Fictitious “child characteristics” (age, gender, and caste) 
were randomly assigned to the exams. Authors report no difference in test scores assigned 
by high caste teachers to exams identified with high caste or low caste students. In contrast, 
low caste female teachers assigned lower grades to exams identified with low caste 
students.  
 In a field experiment on door-to-door solicitation of charitable contributions in North 
Carolina, List and Price (2009) find that minority male fundraisers raise less money than 
majority males, majority females, and minority females. By far the least amount of money 
is donated when minority male fundraisers approach minority households.   
 In a study of the behavior of high school students in South Africa, Burns (2006) uses 
Polaroid photos to reveal the race and gender of students paired across schools to play the 
investment game. She reports that black first movers send significantly lower amounts than 
white or mixed-race students. Burns finds that black second movers receive significantly 
lower amounts than those who are white or mixed-race. This difference comes largely from 
black first-movers, who are substantially less likely to trust black counterparts than others. 
  
 In an experiment with undergraduates at American universities, Eckel and Wilson 
(2006) report results from a discrete form of the investment game in which a first mover 
chooses to send all or none of their endowment to a paired second mover. The experiment 
was conducted across two sites: a subject at one site observed the photograph of the paired 
subject at the other site. Photographs taken during the experiment were subsequently rated 
for skin tone by a separate set of individuals. Eckel and Wilson report that the likelihood a 
first mover sends money to a second mover varies by the skin tone of the second mover: 
subjects with darker skin tones were less likely to receive money. They find no evidence 
of an in-group/out-group effect: all subjects, including those with darker skin, were less 
likely to send money to a recipient with darker skin shade.  
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 Pecenka and Kundhlande (2013) report an experiment in South Africa using a 
dictator game in which a subject can take money from the endowment a paired subject 
earned during the experiment. Dictators at one university were all black. Non-dictators at 
another university were about equally divided between black and white. Surnames were 
used to convey racial identity.  The authors report that racial identity significantly affects 
decisions: black participants on average took 15 percent more from other black participants 
than from whites. 
 Cox and Orman (2015) report an Internet experiment with the moonlighting game 
(Abbink, et al. 2002) involving first-generation immigrants (group I) and native-born 
Americans (group N). There are four treatments involving the following first mover, 
second mover matchings: N-N, N-I, I-N, I-I. The data does not conform to subjects’ 
discriminating between native-born and immigrant subjects according to an in-group, out-
group dichotomy. Native born first movers do not send significantly different amounts to 
immigrant second movers than to native born second movers. Furthermore, when paired 
with a native born second mover, immigrant first movers do not send significantly different 
amounts than do native born first movers. The highly significant treatment effect comes 
from the immigrant-immigrant (I-I) matching. Immigrant first movers in the I-I treatment 
send significantly lower amounts to the immigrant second movers than do first movers in 
any other treatment. Furthermore, first movers in the I-I treatment are significantly more 
likely to take money than first movers in any other treatment.  
 Data from experiments in all of these papers include interactions within and between 
members of a low status group and a high status group. All experiments were run with 
subjects from societies with long-standing discrimination against members of the low 
status group. All experiments produce data inconsistent with in-group vs. out-group 
discrimination in which members of in-groups favor each other over members of out-
groups. Instead, the experiments provide many environments in which members of low 
status groups are unwilling to choose actions that reflect altruism, trust, or reciprocity 
towards other low status individuals. These patterns of behavior exhibit a tragedy in  which 
members of a low status group behave as if they accept prejudicial stereotypes about their 
own group.  
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TABLE 1  
Effects of Caste Identity on Resolution of Social Dilemmas 
 
 
 
Treatment 
Efficiency First Mover Total Allocation 
Second Mover Final 
Allocation 
PG AG PG AG PG AG 
No Caste Info. 
21 (PG), 18(AG) 
0.449 0.207*** 220.7 190.8 269.3 124.4*** 
(0.241) (0.322) (103.3) (129.7) (144.8) (193.2) 
       
High-High 
18 (PG),15 (AG) 
0.572 0.560 265 280 343.3 336 
(0.256) (0.408) (111.1) (142.6) (153.5) (245.0) 
       
High-Low 
22 (PG),25 (AG) 
 0.451 0.365 284.3 249.6 270.7 219.2 
(0.400) (0.385) (128.6) (136.0) (240.3) (231.2) 
       
Low-High 
17(PG), 20 (AG) 
0.302 0.413 192.4 212.2 181.5 248 
(0.308) (0.298) (122.1) (132.5) (184.6) (179.1) 
       
Low-Low 
26(PG) 20 (AG) 
0.169 0.161 209.4 115.5*** 101.7 96.75 
(0.213) (0.186) (107.7) (105.7) (128.0) (111.7) 
On bold, largest and smallest values in a column. Number of observations for each game are below the 
treatment name in the first column; St. Dev. in parenthesis; Game effect significant (Mann-Whitney test) 
at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). 
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TABLE 2  
Tobit Regression of FM Allocations to the Group Fund 
 Provision Game  Appropriation Game  
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
High Caste FM   43.263***   62.925***   (0.000)   (0.002) 
High-High  21.914 24.057  56.787* 40.691  
(0.239) (0.195)  (0.098) (0.234)  
High-Low  33.155* 32.524*  45.846 42.629  
(0.065) (0.067)  (0.132) (0.158)  
Low-High  -18.396 -16.256  14.472 1.617  
(0.328) (0.384)  (0.651) (0.959)  
Low-Low -9.102 -5.019  -76.415** -83.017**  
(0.591) (0.766)  (0.022) (0.012)  
Lower Education  
 
 -25.642* -25.951**  -25.003 -23.047 
 (0.054) (0.048)  (0.299) (0.344) 
Higher Education  
 
 17.591 15.900  12.589 19.204 
 (0.261) (0.302)  (0.639) (0.475) 
Male  
 
 -4.941 -3.553  28.313 39.520* 
 (0.702) (0.779)  (0.218) (0.087) 
Married  
 
 30.950* 28.616  78.902*** 80.549*** 
 (0.085) (0.106)  (0.004) (0.003) 
Constant 
 
79.128*** 57.000*** 47.878** 45.184* -11.512 -47.560 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.013) (0.053) (0.739) (0.124) 
Censored Obs.a {57, 168, 87} {112, 104, 78} 
 nobs {left, right} censored in % nobs {left, right} censored in % 
No Info 63 {17.46, 26.98} 54 {40.74, 27.78} 
High-High 54 {12.96, 31.48} 45 {26.67, 31.11} 
High-Low 66 {18.18, 40.91} 75 {26.67, 32.00} 
Low-High 51 {21.57, 17.65} 60 {38.33, 30.00} 
Low-Low 78 {20.51, 21.79} 60 {58.33, 11.67} 
Model (2) High-Low Low-High Low-Low High-Low Low-High Low-Low 
High-High 
-8.47 
(0.647) 
40.31 
(0.038) 
29.08 
(0.102) 
-1.94 
(0.951) 
39.07 
(0.236) 
123.71*** 
(0.000) 
High-Low 
 48.78* 
(0.010) 
37.54 
(0.027)  
41.01 
(0.163) 
125.65*** 
(0.000) 
Low-High 
  -11.23 
(0.531)   
84.63** 
(0.008) 
a{left, un-, right} censored obs.; All regressors are binary; Control group is no Information treatment; Lower 
Bound is 0, Upper Bound 150; Lower (Higher) Education is a dummy for less (more) than 7 (10) years of 
study; pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the bottom three rows, entries are differences 
in estimated coefficients and Holm-Bonferroni adjusted critical values are used for significance (Holm, 
1979).   
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TABLE 3  
Average Marginal Effects on FM Allocations to the Group Fund 
 
 Provision Game  Appropriation Game  
 MinChoiceb MaxChoicec Lineard MinChoiceb MaxChoicec Lineard 
Treatment       
High-High 0.065 -0.083 4.725 0.094 -0.094 3.283 (0.192) (0.196) (0.196) (0.230) (0.234) (0.237) 
High-Low 0.084* -0.115* 6.373* 0.099 -0.098 3.440 (0.070) (0.066) (0.069) (0.159) (0.149) (0.160) 
Low-High -0.052 0.048 -3.201 0.004 -0.003 0.130 (0.386) (0.380) (0.383) (0.959) (0.959) (0.959) 
Low-Low 
-0.015 0.015 -0.989 -0.214*** 0.144** -6.637** 
(0.766) (0.767) (0.766) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Demographics       
Lower Education 
-0.078* 0.079** -5.036* -0.060 0.051 -2.005 
(0.058) (0.048) (0.055) (0.298) (0.288) (0.298) 
Higher Education 0.044 -0.063 3.435 0.029 -0.027 1.011 
(0.245) (0.268) (0.261) (0.637) (0.641) (0.639) 
Male  -0.014 0.016 -0.968 0.067 -0.059 2.273 
(0.702) (0.702) (0.702) (0.215) (0.216) (0.221) 
Married  0.087* -0.102* 6.064* 0.186*** -0.166*** 6.335*** 
(0.083) (0.082) (0.085) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Observations 312 294 
Censored Obs.a (57, 168, 87) (112, 104, 78) 
a(left, un-, right) censored obs.; bPr(FM Choice>0); cPr(FM Choice<150); cE(FM Choice | uncensored). All 
regressors are binary; Control group is no Information treatment; Lower Bound is 0, Upper Bound 150; 
Lower (Higher) Education is a dummy for villagers with less (more) than 7 (10) years of study; pval in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 4    
Tobit Regression of SM Final Allocations to the Group Fund 
 Provision Game Appropriation Game 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
FM Choice Sum 0.965*** 0.948*** 0.968*** 1.299*** 1.349*** 1.427*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High Caste SM x 
FM Choice Sum 
  0.374   0.112 
  (0.178)   (0.742) 
High-High  6.703 4.117  345.528** 343.921**  (0.949) (0.969)  (0.026) (0.035)  
High-Low  -157.709 -178.374*  129.593 124.338  (0.131) (0.091)  (0.308) (0.341)  
Low-High  -189.082* -219.083**  220.102* 217.966  (0.079) (0.050)  (0.094) (0.103)  
Low-Low -341.304*** -359.906***  73.734 94.566  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.578) (0.491)  
Lower Education   -85.440 -100.401  -94.260 -83.858  (0.240) (0.207)  (0.369) (0.434) 
Higher Education   7.545 -7.872  -11.894 -14.933  (0.943) (0.944)  (0.907) (0.887) 
Male   17.366 -25.549  -61.745 -56.103  (0.804) (0.738)  (0.475) (0.531) 
Married   128.566 27.293  27.213 86.957  (0.202) (0.797)  (0.788) (0.398) 
Constant 168.502* 111.355 19.239 -212.439* -183.798 -108.858 (0.088) (0.429) (0.893) (0.077) (0.205) (0.376) 
Censored Obs.a {25, 46, 33} {31, 36, 31} 
 nobs {left, right} censored in % nobs {left, right} censored in % 
No Info 21 { 9.52, 52.38} 18 {40.44, 22.22} 
High-High 18 { 5.56, 38.89} 15 {26.67, 66.67} 
High-Low 22 {36.36, 40.91} 25 {32.00, 40.00} 
Low-High 17 {23.53, 17.65} 20 {20.00, 30.00} 
Low-Low 26 {38.46, 11.54} 20 {35.00, 5.00} 
Model (2) High-Low Low-High Low-Low High-Low Low-High Low-Low 
High-High 
182.49 
(0.084) 
223.20 
(0.047) 
364.02*** 
(0.001) 
219.58 
(0.122) 
125.96 
(0.392) 
249.36 
(0.110) 
High-Low 
 40.71 
(0.704) 
181.53 
(0.063)  
-93.63 
(0.433) 
29.77 
(0.816) 
Low-High 
  140.82 
(0.165)   
123.40 
(0.339) 
a{left, un-, right} censored obs.; With the exception of FM Choice Sum, all regressors are binary; Control is 
no Info treatment; Lower Bound (0), Upper Bound (FM Choice Sum +150); Lower (Higher) Education 
dummies for villagers with less (more) than 7 (10) years of study; pval in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. In the bottom three rows, entries are differences in estimated coefficients and Holm-Bonferroni 
adjusted critical values are used for significance (Holm, 1979).  
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TABLE 5  
Average Marginal Effects on SM Final Allocations to the Group Fund 
 
 
Provision Game  Appropriation Game  
MinChoiceb MaxChoicec Lineard  MinChoiceb MaxChoicec Lineard 
Treatment        
High-High  0.002 -0.006 0.551  0.286** -0.343** 30.581** 
(0.969) (0.969) (0.969)  (0.023) (0.026) (0.038) 
High-Low  -0.135* 0.231* -24.876*  0.118 -0.109 11.263 
(0.095) (0.075) (0.086)  (0.340) (0.327) (0.342) 
Low-High  -0.176* 0.278** -30.743*  0.197* -0.205* 19.629 
(0.057) (0.035) (0.050)  (0.099) (0.088) (0.113) 
Low-Low -0.340*** 0.405*** -51.096***  0.090 -0.081 8.576 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.485) (0.485) (0.492) 
Demographics        
Lower Education 
-0.077 0.095 -12.029  -0.080 0.088 -8.372 
(0.236) (0.233) (0.239)  (0.367) (0.352) (0.368) 
Higher Education 0.006 -0.009 1.049  -0.010 0.012 -1.049 (0.942) (0.943) (0.942)  (0.907) (0.906) (0.907) 
Male  0.015 -0.019 2.434  -0.052 0.059 -5.470 (0.803) (0.803) (0.804)  (0.470) (0.470) (0.474) 
Married  0.113 -0.144 18.023  0.023 -0.026 2.411 (0.195) (0.190) (0.199)  (0.787) (0.787) (0.787) 
Censored Obs.a (25, 46, 33) (31, 36, 31) 
Observations 104 98 
a(left, un-, right) censored obs.; bPr(SM Choice >0); cPr(SM Choice<FM Choice Sum+150); cE(SM Choice | 
uncensored).With the exception of FM Choice Sum, all regressors are binary; Control group is no Information 
treatment; Lower Bound is 0, Upper Bound is (FM Choice Sum +150); Lower (Higher) Education is a dummy 
for villagers with less (more) than 7 (10) years of study; pval in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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FIGURE 1  
Efficiencies for Caste and Game Form Treatments 
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FIGURE 2  
First Movers’ Choices across Caste and Game Form Treatments 
 
  
 
 
 
35 
FIGURE 3  
Second Mover Choices of Final Group Fund across Caste and Game Form Treatments 
 
 
 
APPENDIX I. DERIVATION OF THEORETICAL RESULTS 
We will use bold letters for vectors, s to index the second mover and capital letters for 
summations. The initial Individual Fund endowment of each player in the provision game 
is e and the initial Group Fund endowment is 0. In the appropriation game, the initial 
Individual Fund endowment of each player is 0 and the initial Group Fund endowment is 
ne (and the value is mne). Let m denote the (constant) marginal multiplier on any player’s  
allocation to the Group Fund.  
Proof of Proposition 1.1 
Let ( )iv ⋅  represent agent i’s convex and monotonic preferences over final payoffs. Let 
 denote the utility from public good consumption, P and private good consumption, 
iy  constructed as a composition of ( )iv ⋅  and the payoff function . That is,  
 
It follows from concavity and monotonicity of  that ui is concave and increasing in 
public good level, P and private good level, 33  
We use Varian’s (1994) approach and look at the second mover’s decision in terms 
of determining the final provision level, P. Adding the aggregate FMs’ allocations, sP−  to 
the Group Fund in the second mover’s budget constraint, we write the second mover’s 
decision problem as 
 
As private and public good are normal goods the second mover’s demand for P (as well as 
for ys) increases with income, se P−+ . That is, (*) ( )s sP D e P−= +  is increasing in : the 
more the first movers allocate to Group Fund the larger the final level.34 
                                                 
33Concavity of  follows from other regarding 
preferences, iv  being concave and increasing in  and the (weak) concavity of  
for all   
34 Note that this is not saying that the second mover’s allocation,  in the Group Fund 
increases in P-s; that may or may not be true. It says that  increases in . It is 
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Part a. As unconditional preferences are defined over final payoffs, it suffices to show that 
our provision and appropriation games are payoff equivalent.  
 Note that player i’s payoff in the provision game when the vector of contributions is 
p, equals player i’s payoff in the appropriation game when the vector of appropriations is, 
, verified as follows  
 
 Next, the payoff equivalence implies that  is a SPE in the 
provision game iff  is a SPE in the appropriation game. It 
follows that, in equilibrium, efficiency of play is the same between games.  
 
Part b. Let  be the most efficient SPE in the provision game and 
let P* denote the provision level, that is, . The optimal (interior) 
allocations satisfy f.o.c.,35 
             
(A.1) 
 
 At any given income  (varying with the first movers’ choices, P-s) by 
Axioms S and R (see Cox et al. 2013),  for some positive 
increasing function . Using the last expression and statement (A.1) at P* we have
 
 
                                                 
straightforward to show that the condition is satisfied (i.e., public good is a normal good) for convex 
altruistic preferences,  such that . 
35 Note that both the first term and the second term are positive so interior optimal pi are possible. 
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 The last inequality requires, in appropriation game, first mover i allocate less in the 
Group Fund, i.e.,  which together with (*) imply that efficiency of play in the 
appropriation game is smaller than in the payoff equivalent provision game.  
Proof of Proposition 1.2 
Let the sequential game be given and consider a group of individuals playing it. Let 
 be the most efficient SPE for this group of individuals in the game. Let, 
*P  denote the provision level, i.e., . The optimal (interior) 
allocations satisfy f.o.c., 
    (A.2)
  
Part a-c. Consider another group (call it 2) whose individuals are sufficiently36 more 
altruistic than individuals in the previous group; call it group 1. Let Eij denote the efficiency 
of the best SPE when all first movers are from group i (=1,2) and the second mover is from 
group j (=1,2). We show that .37  
 Let the FMs total allocation,  to the Group Fund be given. It follows from group 
2 individuals being sufficiently more altruistic than group 1 individuals that
 for some positive increasing function ( )ϕ ⋅ . Substituting 
 and differentiating with respect to  we have  
  
 Using the last equality and statement (A.2), we show that a first mover i from group 
1 when the second mover is from group 2 would allocate more than *ip  in the Group Fund 
because at P*  
                                                 
36 Let’s call individuals in group i, type i. We say that type 2 is sufficiently more altruistic than type 
1 if the difference between the demands for the public good of the two types increases in income, 
Y. 
37 The proof for  is similar. 
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This together with the second mover’s demand for public good increasing in FMs total 
allocations imply that . 
Next, we show that . Let  be the most efficient SPE when 
first movers are from group 1 and the second mover is from group 2. Let, **P  denote the 
provision level (i.e., ). Optimal (interior) allocations, by f.o.c. 
satisfy 
    
 
which can be equivalently written as 
    (A.3)
 
  The first ratio is the marginal rate of substitution, wtp(.) of private for public good. 
It follows from group 2 individuals being more altruistic that, at  
  
which together with equality (A.3) imply that for a first mover i from group 2 we have 
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Thus, a first mover i from group 2 wants to increase her own allocation in Group Fund 
above 
1 2
**
|i sp  and therefore in equilibrium, efficiency of play is higher in homogenous group 
2, then in the mixed group with first movers form group 1 and the second mover from 
group 2.  
Proof of Proposition 2 
Let group-contingent preferences be represented by some concave function  
increasing in own and insiders’ payoffs, but decreasing in outsiders’ payoffs.  
 The proof of part 1 is identical to the proof of part a of Proposition 1.1 because 
group-contingent preferences are defined over final payoffs, and therefore for payoff-
equivalent games are game invariant.  
 To show part 2, note that the composition of our mixed groups consist of all first 
movers being from one cast and the second mover being from another cast. It follows from 
the marginal per capita return,  and from second mover’s preferences decreasing 
in outsiders’ payoffs (i.e., first movers in the mixed groups) that it is optimal for the second 
mover to appropriate the entire amount in the Group Fund. That is,  as 
 
where . Given second mover’s strategy, it is dominant for any first mover i to 
allocate 0 in the Group Fund as for any positive allocations, p-i of other first movers, we 
have 
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The inequality follows from identity preferences, fi increasing in own and other first 
movers’ payoffs (who are from the same group as i) and decreasing in the second mover’s 
payoff who is not from i’s group. 
 
APPENDIX II. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON PROCEDURES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENT 
The groups were formed based on the caste categories to which each subject belonged. 
Each subject was invited to come to a separate room to make her individual decision in 
private. After each subject came in and took his or her seat in the private room, the 
experimenter briefly explained the procedure and rules once again. Thereafter, the subject 
was handed a decision sheet based on his or her role as first mover or second mover. Across 
all ten treatments, the second mover subject was also informed about the amount of money 
contributed (PG) to or extracted (AG) from the Group Fund by each of the three first 
movers. The subject was asked to carefully consider all the information and thereafter make 
his or her decision in private. In the caste-informed treatments, each subject in a four-
person group was informed about the caste composition of the other members of the group. 
No information about the caste of the other group members was provided to the subjects in 
the no-caste-information treatments.  
We had to overcome difficulties in recruiting lower caste subjects. In order to be 
able to recruit a heterogeneous subject sample, we went to villages with relatively large 
presence of lower caste individuals. In other locations, we found subjects typically arriving 
at the experiment site in groups with their friends or neighbors. To ensure that subjects did 
not play strategically believing that their friends would be in the same group, we applied 
the following procedure. The name and village of residence of the subjects had been taken 
down one after the other in the order of arrival at the experiment site. Each subject was 
called by name one after the other to come to the private room. However consecutive 
people being called to the private room were placed in different groups. For example, 
subject numbers 1, 2 and 3 may have come from the same village and be called one after 
the other, but we placed them in different groups –for example subject #1 may be the first 
mover person 1 in Group 1, subject #2 could be the first mover person 1 in Group 2 and 
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subject #3 could be the second mover person 1 in Group 3. At the time of explaining the 
instructions of the game, the subjects were clearly informed that they would be in groups 
different from their friends. When a subject came to the private room to make the decision, 
he or she was once again reminded that friends were not in the same group. Subjects may 
have made an assumption of a person’s caste or characteristics when they saw the last 
person leaving the room. To minimize any effects from such observations, subjects were 
specifically informed that the previous person leaving the room would not be in their group. 
Difficulties with collecting information on income. During February 2012, a series of 
questions about household income was asked after all decisions had been made. However, 
we will not use these income figures in this analysis. Several subjects mentioned that their 
answers may be incorrect since they were themselves unaware of how much they consume 
out of their own produce and how much they sell. This proportion varies across the year – 
depending on the seasonality of the plant. In such occasions, the experimenter asked for 
the most recent month and how much they earned during that time, but again, this may not 
reflect the correct figure as some plants grow well during winter months and poorly during 
warmer months. Muslim female subjects in some no-caste information groups informed 
the experimenter that their husbands do not inform them of how much they earn. Several 
Hindu women mentioned that they live in a joint family with the families of their brothers-
in-law or uncles and are hence unaware of what the total family income is. Hence it is 
possible that the information provided by these subjects is incorrect. In many cases, 
subjects became defensive at the question of income. The subjects would ask why this 
income question was being asked and why such information would be necessary. Some 
subjects admitted that they would not provide their correct income information. In some 
other occasions, the subject would provide a broad range and left the experimenter the task 
of guessing an accurate figure. In other cases, the subject would admit that they did not 
have any source of income and they depended on loans from family members or neighbors 
for sustenance. 
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APPENDIX III. ADDITIONAL FIGURES 
 
FIGURE A.1  
Average Extensive Margins for First and Second Movers 
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FIGURE A.2  
Average Margins for Second Movers 
 
 
